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Silent Revolution, Counter-revolution, or Cultural Conflict? 
Political Cultural Change and its Influence on Class Voting in Western Countries (1956-
1990) 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
First we investigate how the political culture in western countries has changed over time. 
Three theoretical views are put to the test using data on party-manifestos. The first predicts 
that only new-leftist issues will increase in salience. The second predicts that both new-leftist 
and new-rightist issues will emerge at the same time. The third, which is empirically 
corroborated, predicts that first new-leftist issues will emerge followed by the rise in new- 
rightist issues.  
  Second, we investigate how the emergence of these new issues has affected the 
traditional class-party alignments. Using the International Mobility and Stratification File we 
show that the middle class increasingly votes left wing as new-leftist issues become more 
important and that the working class increasingly votes right wing as new-rightist issues 
become more important. What’s more, the middle class appears to alienate from the 
traditional party of their class as new-rightist issues rise in salience.  
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1 Introduction 
 
With their polemically titled article ‘Are Social Classes Dying?’ Clark and Lipset (1991) 
sparked a lively debate on the relevance of class for voting behavior (cf. Evans, 1999; Clark 
and Lipset 2001). In this discussion Nieuwbeerta showed that traditional class party 
alignments in western societies are fading: the working class increasingly supports right-wing 
parties whereas the middle class increasingly supports parties on the left (1995; 2001; De 
Graaf en Nieuwbeerta, 1995; see also: Clark & Lipset, 1991; Dalton, 1988; Dogan, 1995; 
Franklin, 1985; Heath et al., 1996; Rose & McAllister, 1986). Most political sociologists 
nowadays agree that class voting – the relationship between class position and voting 
behavior – has declined in the post-war era, and that future studies should therefore aim at 
explaining this downward trend (Nieuwbeerta 2001: 133). 
 Of course, Nieuwbeerta tried to explain the decline in class voting using hypotheses 
derived from class analysis. What is striking, however, is that his efforts point out that the 
class approach to politics is by and large impotent in explaining why this decline has occurred 
in the first place and why the strength of the relationship between class and voting differs 
between countries (see Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Nieuwbeerta et al. 2000; Nieuwbeerta en Ultee, 
1999). Other scholars relate the declining relevance of class for voting behavior to the rise of 
a ‘post-modern’ (Inglehart, 1997a), ‘post-industrial’ (Clark and Rempel 1998) or ‘new’ 
political culture (Clark, 2001a, 2001b, see also: Achterberg, 2004, 2005). They all argue that 
non-economic or cultural issues of individual freedom and social order have become more 
salient.1 This resulted in a ‘new’ cultural cleavage existing parallel to the ‘old’ class cleavage 
in the political domain, giving rise to rightist voting behavior by the working class and leftist 
voting behavior by the middle class (cf. Achterberg and Houtman, 2005; Elchardus, 1996; 
Houtman, 2003; Inglehart, 1997a).  
The ‘new political culture’ approach thus seems promising for explaining the 
declining relationship between class and party preference. However, fundamental 
disagreement about two issues still exists. There is disagreement about the exact nature of 
change in political cultures and about the exact mechanism through which the changing 
political cultures lead to a declining relationship between class and voting. Therefore, in this 
article we will investigate how the new political culture developed and how it led to a rightist 
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voting working class and a leftist voting middle class. Hence, in the first part of this article we 
will test how political culture has developed in recent decades. In the second part of this 
article we will assess whether, and if so, in what way, this affects the voting behavior of the 
working class and the middle class. 
 
 
2 The changing political culture 
 
There are roughly three different views in the debate about the changing nature of political 
culture. All argue that cultural issues have increased in salience in the political culture of 
western societies. However, these three views differ considering the period of this 
development and the nature of these issues. In the first, it is argued that only progressively 
natured cultural issues (i.e. libertarian issues) have generally grown in salience (Inglehart, 
1977, 1997a; see also: Clark, 2001a). Inglehart, one of the most dominant proponents of this 
view, describes the changes in political culture, in Inglehart’s terms the rise of a 
‘postmodernist’ political culture, as follows: “Postmodernism is the rise of new values and 
lifestyles, with greater tolerance for ethnic, cultural, and sexual diversity and individual 
choice concerning the kind of life one wants to lead.” (1997a: 23 italics in original). 
According to this argument individual freedom, self-actualization, and cultural heterogeneity 
are increasingly considered valuable issues. In other words, Inglehart uses new left (stressing 
libertarian issues) and new politics virtually as synonyms to each other (Flanagan, 1987: 
1305) 
 Inglehart argues that libertarian issues have risen in salience because of the emphasis 
put on them by younger age cohorts, induced by their socialization in times of great prosperity 
and material security. Inglehart (1977) labelled this process the ‘silent revolution’. This 
reasoning has face value because in the sixties all kinds of libertarian natured social 
movements, such as the peace movement, and movements for the emancipation of women, 
homosexuals, and ethnic minorities, have risen (cf. Kriesi, 1989). Since then these movements 
have been active in public discourse and are increasingly represented in parliaments by new-
leftist or libertarian parties. And, according to Inglehart (1997a: 251), authoritarian issues are 
bound to die out because ‘they do not represent the wave of the future’. 
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 In the second view it is argued that in the same period in which libertarian issues 
increased in salience, cultural issues of a conservative nature (i.e. authoritarian issues) have 
risen in salience as well (Lyons, 1996; Klatch, 1999). Some consider right-wing populist 
movements of the fifties as the predecessor of these authoritarian tendencies (Plotke, 2001). 
According to this view the new political culture is characterized by an increasing cultural 
conflict in recent decades in which both libertarian and authoritarian issues have risen in 
salience simultaneously (cf. Hunter, 1991; see also Layman, 2001). 
 The third view theorizes that the rising salience of libertarian issues induced a 
countermovement. According to Ignazi (1992, 2003; see also: Flanagan, 1987; Veugelers, 
2000) this authoritarian countermovement rose in the late seventies as a reaction to the rising 
salience of new leftist libertarian movements in the sixties and seventies: ‘However, the same 
process of class and value de-alignment provoked by post-industrialism has produced 
different and even opposite concerns. While on one side the post-material agenda and its 
political by-products – the left-libertarian and green parties – expressed the drive for self-
affirmation, on the other, a different set of post-industrial outcomes such as the weakening of 
the state – and national – authority in the domestic and international arena, the erosion of 
traditional social bonds, the perceived collapse of conventional moral standards and sexual 
mores, and the waning of an ordered, hierarchical, homogeneous, and safe society fuelled the 
need for self-defence and self-reassurence’ (Ignazi, 2003: 201 italics in original).  
Many deem the erosion of the social order that is characteristic for modern society as 
problematic. The rise of values stressing individual freedom and cultural heterogeneity leads 
to feelings of insecurity and disturbance: ‘The need for being taken care of, being part of an 
aggregate, and being provided with an identity have fermented in Western countries for quite 
some time with no political interpretation. They had remained ‘silent’ because of a lack of 
interpreters, contrary to what happened on the left side. They propelled a form of ‘silent 
counter-revolution’ in attitudes’ (Ignazi, 2003: 201). This ‘silent counter-revolution’ refers to 
the rise of neo-conservatism and of the new-right since the mid-seventies. These political 
movements: “Reflected the demands for identity (hence nationalism), for homogeneity (hence 
xenophobia), and for order, hierarchy, and strong leadership (hence authoritarianism)” 
(Ignazi, 2003: 202). According to Ignazi, the genesis of postmodern society, and the emphasis 
on libertarianism have led to a counter-movement in which feelings of insecurity and 
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uncertainty have been converted into an authoritarian political agenda, which is put forward in 
the political arena by the new-right.   
 Summing up, the views on political cultural change differ with respect to its nature 
and the chronological order in which they argue changes are taking place. The difference 
between the first and the last two views on the changing political culture concerns its nature. 
The first view puts forward that changes in political culture in Western societies since the 
sixties merely concern the rising salience of libertarian or new-leftist issues. This will be 
tested with the first hypothesis: libertarian issues rise in salience where authoritarian issues 
do not. The other two views suggest that as libertarian issues rise in salience authoritarian 
issues rise in salience as well. The difference between the second and the third vision 
concerns the chronological order of this process. Whereas the second view argues that 
libertarian and authoritarian cultural issues rise in salience at the same time, i.e. a rising 
cultural conflict, the third view argues that the rise in salience of libertarian issues precedes 
the rise in salience of authoritarian issues, i.e. a counter-revolution. The second hypothesis 
tests which view is supported: authoritarian issues rise later in salience than libertarian 
issues do. 
 
 
3 Data and measurement 
 
To test the hypotheses one has to measure the salience of libertarian and authoritarian issues. 
Following the work of Clark (2001b) and Achterberg (2006) for this purpose we use the Party 
Manifesto Data (provided by: Budge et al., 2001). In this data set policy priorities have been 
quantified for twenty-five Western countries between 1946 and 1998 using party manifestos. 
All sentences and quasi-sentences have been classified in 56 policy priorities. The relative 
importance of each policy priority has been weighed by the percentage of the votes for the 
party of the manifesto under consideration. This method avoids that policy priorities of 
splinter parties have a disproportionate impact. Subsequently, for every policy priority an 
annual total has been calculated. This means that the salience of each policy priority for every 
country within an election year has been determined.  
 We constructed an index for the salience of libertarian and for the salience of 
authoritarian issues for fifteen countries.2 This led to 234 country/year-combinations for 
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which the relative importance of each policy priority has been calculated. The four issues used 
by Achterberg (2006) for a cultural issue saillance-index will be split in libertarian and 
authoritarian issues. 
 authoritarian issue salience-index – The authoritarian issues used by Achterberg are: 
‘Traditional Morality: Positive’ and ‘Law and Order’. The first item measures the attention 
paid in Part Manifesto’s to “favourable mentions of traditional moral values; prohibition, 
censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behavior; maintenance and stability 
of family; religion” (Budge et al., 2001: 227). The second item measures the attention paid to 
issues like “enforcement of all laws; actions against crime; support and resources for police; 
tougher attitudes in courts” (ibid.). A authoritarian issue salience-index is made with these 
two items. A higher score on this index means greater saillance of authoritarian issues in a 
given country/year-combination.3 
authoritarian issue salience-index – The progressive cultural issues in Achterberg’s 
index are: ‘traditional morality: negative’ and ‘underprivileged minority groups’. The first 
item is the antipode of ‘traditional morality: positive’, which is used in the authoritarian issue 
salience-index. It concerns: “opposition to traditional moral values; support for divorce, 
abortion etc.; otherwise as [traditional morality: positive], but negative” (ibid.). The second 
item is the attention in the party manifesto’s paid to: “favourable references to 
underprivileged minorities who are defined neither in economic nor in demographic terms, 
e.g. the handicapped, disabled, homosexuals, immigrants, refugees etc.” (Budge et al., 2001: 
228). A libertarian issue salience-index is made with these two items. A higher score on this 
index stands for more salience of libertarian issues in a given country/year-combination.4  
 
 
4 Results 
 
To test hypothesis one – libertarian issues rise in salience where authoritarian issues do not – 
the score of every country/year-combination on the libertarian issue salience-index and the 
authoritarian cultural issue salience -index will be plotted in scatterplots (figures 1 and 2). 
Each scatterplot contains a linear regression line. The comparison of the regression lines in 
the scatterplots shows that both libertarian and authoritarian issues have risen in salience in 
recent decades.   
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 The trends have been split by country in table 1. In nine countries libertarian issues 
have significantly become more salient in recent decades. In only one country, Finland, it has 
declined in salience in this period. The salience of conservative cultural issues has risen 
significantly in eight countries as well, while in one country, the Netherlands, it shows 
declining salience that is almost significant. At aggregated as well as country level both 
progressive and conservative cultural issues have risen in salience. Subsequently hypothesis 
one is rejected. 
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Figure 1 Libertarian issue salience, 1946 through 1998.       Figure 2 Authoritarian issue salience, 1946 through 1998.  
Pearson’s r = 0.234** (1% one-sided)                              Pearson’s r = 0.399** (1% one-sided) 
 
Table 1 Correlations between cultural issue-indices with year of elections by country (1946-1998) 
Country Libertarian issues Authoritarian issues  N 
Australia 0.407*  0.524** 22 
Austria  0.423  0.686** 15 
Belgium -0.194  0.062 17 
Canada 0.550*  0.545* 17 
Denmark 0.447*  0.817** 21 
Germany 0.802**  0.631** 14 
Finland -0.657** -0.056 15 
France 0.600*  0.344 14 
Great-Brittain 0.003  0.843** 14 
Ireland 0.630** 0.781*** 15 
Italy 0.425  0.388 14 
The Netherlands 0.871** -0.423 16 
Norway  0.327  0.107 14 
United States -0.069  0.827** 13 
Zwitserland  0.772**  0.048 13 
Totaal  0.234**  0.399** 234 
* p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001 one sided  
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The question remains whether  authoritarian issues rise in salience at the same time as 
libertarian issues, or if they rise in salience later, as a reaction to the risen salience of 
libertarian issues. This is put to the test with the second hypothesis. Therefore the postwar 
period is split into two era’s. The first from 1946, the year of the first scores, to 1975, the 
second from 1976 to 1998. 1975 has been chosen as a braking point because Ignazi states that 
the new-right has come up since the mid-seventies as a reaction to the rise of the new-left. 
(2003: 204). Again, each scatterplot contains a linear regression line. This makes it possible to 
control if the salience of libertarian and authoritarian issues develops as argued in the second 
hypothesis. Figure 3 shows the scores on the index for the salience of libertarian issues for all 
countries under consideration from 1946 to 1975. Figure 4 shows these scores for the years 
1976 to 1998.  
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Figure 3 Libertarian  issue salience, 1946 through 1975.         Figure 4 Libertarian issue salience, 1976 through 1998.        
Pearson’s r = 0.163* (5% one-tailed)                     Pearson’s r = 0.033 (n.s.)  
 
Comparison of the regression lines shows that the rise of libertarian issues only takes place 
before 1975. Moreover, the rise until 1975 is significant.5 After 1975 there is no significant 
increase whatsoever: libertarian issues maintain at the same level of importance.  
 According to Ignazi the silent counter-revolution begins around 1975. To test this 
assumption, in figure 5 the scores on the authoritarian issue salience-index of each election 
year from 1946 to 1975 have been plotted. Figure 6 shows these scores for the years 1976 
through 1998.  Comparison of the regression lines in figure 5 and 6 shows that the rise of 
salience of authoritarian issues can be attributed to the post-1975 period. In the pre-1975 
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period the salience of these issues actually declines.6 The correlations confirm this perception. 
The declining salience of the authoritarian issues is insignificant, while the rising salience 
after 1975 is significant. 
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Figure 5 Authoritarian issue salience, 1946 through 1975.       Figure 6 Authoritarian issue salience, 1976 through 1998. 
Pearson’s r = -0.076 (n.s.)           Pearson’s r = 0.547*** (0,1% one-sided) 
 
Table 2 Correlations between cultural issue-indices with year of elections by country (1946-1998) 
 
Country  Libertarian 
issue salience 
until 1975 
N Authoritarian 
issue salience 
until 1975 
N Libertarian 
issue salience 
after 1975 
N Authoritarian 
issue salience 
after 1975 
N 
Australia -0.165  13  0.116 13  0.187 9  0.470 9 
Austria  0.036   9  0.271   9   0.324 6  0.537 6 
Belgium  0.276*  10 -0.690*  10 -0.376  7  0.727* 7 
Canada  0.505 11 -0.427 11  0.021 6  0.777* 6 
Denmark  0.223 12  0.705** 12  0.561 9  0.797** 9 
Germany -0.217    7  0.587   7  0.718* 7  0.755*  7 
Finland -0.631*  10 -0.423**  10 -0.199  5 -0.462  5 
France  0.720 *   8 -0.573    8 -0.272  6  0.876*  6 
Great-Brittain  0.476   9  0.711*   9 -0.711  5  0.843*  5 
Ireland 0.423 8 0.255 8 0.750** 7 0.861*** 7 
Italy  0.694*   7 -0.354    7 -0.400 7  0.684*  7 
The Netherlands  0.762**   9 -0.862**   9  0.313 7  0.954*** 7 
Norway  0.783**   8 -0.803**    8 -0.755*  6  0.523 6 
United States  0.444   7  0.874**   7 -0.171  6  0.799*  6 
Zwitserland  0.434   8 -0.472   8  0.351 5  0.427 5 
Total  0.163* 137 -0.067  137 0.033 99  0.547 *** 98 
* p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001 one sided      
 
In Table 2 the four trends are split by country. The results lead to the same conclusions 
as on aggregated level. Six of the trends in libertarian issue salience between 1946 through 
1975 are significant. Of these six countries only the trend in Finland is negative: in Finland 
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libertarian issues have declined in salience. The remaining five significant trends are in line 
with hypothesis two. From 1976 through 1998 there are only three significant trends in 
libertarian issue salience, two positive, one negative.  
There are seven significant trends in authoritarian issue salience from 1946 through 
1975. Three out of these seven trends are positive, four are negative: obviously, a trendless 
fluctuation. In contrast, ten of these trends are significant in the period after 1975. What’s 
more, they are all positive as predicted in hypothesis two. Just as on aggregated level, the 
trends for authoritarian issue salience for countries separately show a rise after the rise of the 
trends in progressive cultural issue salience. Subsequently, hypothesis two – authoritarian 
issues rise later in salience than libertarian issues do – is confirmed. 
 After testing the first two hypotheses the theory of Ignazi can be confirmed. Changes 
in political culture in the west cannot merely be attributed to the rising salience of libertarian 
issues as argued by Inglehart. The salience of authoritarian issues has risen just as well. 
Clearly, the trends show that these changes concern a silent counterrevolution because 
conservative cultural issues have risen in salience later than progressive cultural issues.  
It is clear that from the sixties onwards libertarian as well as authoritarian issues have 
risen in salience. These trends consider the same countries, but not the same period. The 
correlation between the trends in progressive cultural issue salience before 1975 and the 
trends in conservative cultural issue salience after 1975 is 0.69 (p<0.01), which confirms this 
pattern. Every other combination of trends does not lead to significant correlations. This 
means that a strong rising trend in new-leftist libertarian issues in a country before 1975 leads 
to strong rising counter-trends in new-rightist authoritarian issues after 1975. 
 
 
5 The changing political culture and its influence on class voting  
 
As argued in the introduction several scholars assessing the fading relationship between the 
working class and left-wing parties and between the middle class and right-wing parties point 
out that this is caused by a changing political culture. However, these scholars differ in 
opinion how this happens. In the literature there roughly are two different mechanisms – that 
of appellation and that of alienation. 
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 In the first place, the appellation mechanism refers to the changing appeals of political 
parties due to the changing political culture causing a realignment of the traditional pattern of 
a leftist working class and a rightist middle class. Inglehart argues that the rise of 
‘postmaterialism’ is in fact the rising salience of middle class values: “Within any given 
society, Postmaterialist values will be most widespread among the more secure strata: the 
wealthier and better educated will be most likely to hold a whole range of Postmodern values, 
including Postmaterialism” (1997b: 59). Political parties of the left will, generally spoken, be 
more libertarian in their appeals to the electorate, whereas rightist parties will accentuate 
authoritarian issues to appeal voters. According to Inglehart the middle class is inclined to 
vote for a left-wing party because of their libertarian beliefs (Inglehart, 1997a). As left-
libertarian issues become more important, and as such appeal more to the libertarian beliefs of 
the middle class, it may be expected that the middle class increasingly votes left as libertarian 
issues are more important in the political culture. In the contra-revolution perspective the 
same line of reasoning leads to the argument that the working class will be more inclined to 
vote for a right-wing party because of the rising salience of authoritarian issues in the political 
culture (compare Ignazi, 2003).  
Bringing these two lines of reasoning together with the results of the first part of this 
article leads to the perspective that before 1975 the middle class will increasingly vote left-
wing because of the rising salience of libertarian issues, while the working class will be 
voting just as left as ever. After 1975 the middle class will not be inclined to increasingly vote 
for leftist parties, while the working class will increasingly vote right-wing because of the 
rising salience in authoritarian issues. Consequently, the changes in political culture will 
expectedly lead to a fading pattern of a right-wing voting middle class and a left-wing voting 
working class. 
Second, the mechanism of alienation refers to the repulsion of the traditional class 
base of political parties due to the changing political culture causing the political parties to 
alienate their traditional class base. In 1972 Ransford showed that the working class in the 
early seventies demonstrated a right-authoritarian reaction to protests of blacks and libertarian 
students (Ransford, 1972). Clark (Clark, 2001b:281) describes this mechanism for the 
presidential elections of 1972 in the United States. In his campaign for presidency, the 
candidate for the Democrats – George McGovern – strongly emphasized culturally 
progressive issues, alienating the traditional supporters of the Democratic party – members of 
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the working class. Because they massively supported the Republicans instead, the inevitable 
result that year was a historically low degree of class voting.7 The growing salience of 
libertarian issues in left-wing parties thus leads to, apart from an increasing proportion of the 
middle class voting left, the alienation of the working class from left-wing parties that 
traditionally represent their class interests. Consequently, this leads to increasing proportions 
of the working class voting for right-wing parties instead of left-wing parties (Brint, 1984; 
Lipset, 1981). The same mechanism, in opposite direction, can occur when authoritarian 
issues are being emphasized: Not only will a party emphasizing authoritarian issues appeal to 
support from the working class but also alienate members of the middle class, who are more 
libertarian.  
In short, in this mechanism the working class increasingly votes right because the 
increasing salience of libertarian issues alienates them from leftist parties. The middle class 
will increasingly support parties on the left because the growing attention for authoritarian 
issues increasingly alienates them from the traditional parties of their class – the right-wing 
parties. The two perspectives thus both predict that the working class and the middle class 
increasingly support rightist respectively leftist parties. Because in the political culture of 
western countries the rise of authoritarian issues followed that of the libertarian issues, we can 
empirically test whether either of the two perspectives can account for the fact that the middle 
class has increasingly voted for leftist and the working class has increasingly voted for rightist 
parties.  
Following the first mechanism of appellation, we expect that the middle class 
increasingly votes left in the period before 1975 (hypothesis 3a) due to the rising salience of 
libertarian issues that appeals them to vote left (hypothesis 3b). We also expect that the 
working class increasingly votes right from 1975 onwards (hypothesis 4a) due to the rising 
salience of authoritarian issues that appeals them to vote right (hypothesis 4b). Following the 
mechanism of alienation, we expect that in the period preceding 1975 the working class 
increasingly votes right (hypothesis 5a) due to the rising salience of libertarian issues that 
alienates them from the left (hypothesis 5b). Furthermore, we expect that from 1975 onward 
the middle class increasingly votes left (hypothesis 6a) due to the rising salience of 
authoritarian issues that alienate them from the right (hypothesis 6b).  
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6 Data and measurement 
 
Class – To test the hypotheses above we use the data-file Nieuwbeerta has used for his 
research on the declining relationship between class and voting behavior (Nieuwbeerta & 
Ganzeboom, 1996). The variables that are necessary to test the hypotheses are available for 15 
countries. The number of data files for each separate country varies from one to twenty-five, 
and covers a period from 1956 to 1991.8 The famous and often-used EGP-class schema in 
these files consists of ten separate classes, which have been collapsed by us to seven classes 
conform the method provided by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 38-39). The seven classes 
are: 1: Managers, 2: Professionals, 3: Non-manual routine workers, 4: Petty Bourgeoisie 5: 
Skilled manual workers, 6: Semi-skilled manual workers, 7: Unskilled manual workers. Some 
classes cannot easily be ordered into a working class – middle class distinction. The non-
manual routine workers are for example sometimes seen as working class and sometimes seen 
as middle class. Because the economic position of this class is not as strong as that of the 
managers and professionals (Wright, 1979; 1985), we do not consider this class as an 
exponent of the middle class. Due to of their relatively favorable economic position we 
consider the classes of the managers, professionals, and petty bourgeoisie as exponents of the 
middle class. Because of their relatively poor economic position, we consider the working 
class to be constituted by the classes of semi- and unskilled manual workers. For the class of 
the skilled manual workers it is less obvious whether they are working class workers. 
Goldthorpe describes this class as “a latter-day aristocracy of labour, or a ‘blue collar’ elite” 
(cited by Houtman, 2003: 31).  
Voting behavior – Like Nieuwbeerta (1995: 35), we use three different types of 
questions on voting behavior: data about the party one would vote for if elections were held 
today (or soon), about the party one has voted for in the past, and the party one identifies 
with. If valid answers to all of these three questions were available, we used the first one, i.e., 
voting intention. If valid answers to only the last two were available, we used party 
identification. We do not use Nieuwbeerta’s crude left versus non-left distinction, because it 
creates more or less arbitrary decisions in coding parties in the political center. We instead 
scale voting behavior according to left-right self-placement, so as to produce a continuous 
variable with high scores indicating rightist voting. Next to the arbitrary classification of 
parties in the political centre Nieuwbeerta’s dichotomie suffers another flaw: new-leftist 
parties are classified as non-left parties. Given massive support for those parties from the 
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middle class (Hoffman-Martinot 1991, Inglehart 1997a: 273-288), it needs no further 
argument that this decision produces a less dramatic decline of the relationship between class 
and voting than has actually occurred. 
 A higher score on the new left-right voting behavior variable stands for a more rightist 
party.9 In the analyses all respondents with missing values on either right-wing voting behavior 
or EGP-class position have been deleted listwise which results in a dataset containing 128,977 
respondents distributed over 94 country/year combinations. 
 
 
7 The cultural voting behavior of EGP-classes 
 
In studies of class voting there is an almost overwhelming attention for the leftist (or 
rightist) voting behavior of classes relative to other classes. This method unables investigation 
into the questions whether, and why particular classes have altered their voting behavior. 
Consequently if we are to investigate whether the middle class has moved to the left in the 
period before 1975 we should only investigate the voting behavior of this particular class and 
not compared to the voting behavior of the working class (compare Manza and Brooks, 1999). 
Therefore, we split up the dataset into 14 subsets (for each class in each period one subset) to 
test hypotheses 3a, 4a, 5a, and 6a using multi-level techniques. Multi-level techniques allow 
to split the variance of the dependent variable into several levels. In our models three levels 
are involved: individual level, year level and country level. In this way we can control for 
resemblance within years and countries in the way in which people vote left or right. As 
independent variable we use the variable election year. In Table 3 the results of the fourteen 
multilevel analyses are summarized. It shows that the unskilled manual workers, semi-skilled 
workers, the professionals and the managers have increasingly been voting for a leftist party 
in the period before 1975.  
Above we explained that we consider the classes of the managers, petty bourgeoisie, 
and professionals as the most pure exponents of the middle class and the classed of the semi- 
and unskilled manual workers as the most pure exponents of the working classed. Hypothesis 
3a can thus be confirmed: the middle class has indeed increasingly been voting for a leftist 
party in the period before 1975. The theory that the working class is alienated by the rise of 
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libertarian issues before 1975 can be rejected, as the working class moves more to the left. In 
the period after 1975 the middle class (the professionals and the petty bourgeoisie) continues 
 
Table 3 Multi-level regression analysis for each class in the period through 1975 and the period after 1975 
(1956-1990). Dependent is right-wing voting behavior (Method: Maximum likelihood)
 
Subset Independent 
variable: 
election year 
Standard errors N Individual 
level 
N Country/ year 
combinations 
Before 1975     
Managers -0.042** (0.019) 2,341 33 
Professionals -0.027* (0.014) 5,584 33 
Non-manual routine -0.019 (0.014) 7,259 33 
Petty Bourgeoisie  -0.012 (0.015) 4,570 33 
Skilled manual workers -0.027 (0.020) 625 33 
Semiskilled manual workers -0.019* (0.010) 6,046 33 
Unskilled manual workers -0.018** (0.009) 8,634 33 
  
   
After 1975     
Managers -0.003 (0.006) 8,145 62 
Professionals -0.014** (0.005) 19,375 62 
Non-manual routine -0.003 (0.005) 23,166 62 
Petty Bourgeoisie  -0.017** (0.007) 7,399 62 
Skilled manual workers  0.013 (0.009) 3,004 62 
Semiskilled manual workers  0.007* (0.004) 14,151 62 
Unskilled manual workers  0.001 (0.004) 18,678 62 
* p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001 one-sided    
 
to increasingly vote left, confirming hypothesis 6a. Only the class of the semi-skilled workers 
increasingly votes for rightist parties in the period after 1975, which confirms hypothesis 7a. 
To test whether the rising salience of authoritarian and libertarian issues has anything 
to do with the changing patterns in voting behavior of these classes a different sort of analysis 
needs to be done. After all, the strengthening of the ties between the working class and leftist 
parties before 1975 may also be caused by the growing libertarian appeals drawing working 
class support for the leftist parties. In such case, the silent revolution would not be middle 
class phenomenon, but a general cultural phenomenon instead.  
To test 3b, 4b, 5b, and 6b again we estimate some multi-level models (see Table 4).10 
Now all seven classes have been included in the analyses. Model 1 shows the effects of class 
position and the three contextual variables (election year, libertarian issue salience, and 
authoritarian issue salience) on voting for a rightist party. To a very large extent the class 
position determines whether a person votes left or right. Compared to the class of the 
managers (which is the reference category) the petty bourgeoisies votes more right-wing  
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Table 4 Explaining right-wing voting behavior by class, election year, and indicators for political culture 
(Multi-level analysis; N=128,977 in 94 country/year combinations within 15 countries; method: Maximum 
likelihood; 1956-1990).  
Independents  Null-Model   Model 1  Model 2  
Constant 48.122** (1.970) 48.042** (1.911) 48.025** (1.912) 
Managers REF  REF  REF  
Professionals   -0.950**** (0.192) -0.977**** (0.192) 
Non-manual routine   -1.592**** (0.290) -1.486**** (0.285) 
Petty Bourgeoisie     0.592**** (0.299)  0.623**** (0.306) 
Skilled manual workers   -0.965**** (0.179) -0.939**** (0.173) 
Semiskilled manual workers   -3.325**** (0.525) -3.249**** (0.513) 
Unskilled manual workers   -3.326**** (0.586) -3.214**** (0.577) 
Context       
Election year   -0.112 (0.207) -0.111 (0.207) 
Salience of authoritarian issues   -0.053 (0.265) -0.060 (0.264) 
Salience of libertarian issues    -0.111 (0.245) -0.112 (0.244) 
Interactions       
Managers      
Professionals X libertarian issues    0.020 (0.098) 
Non-manual routine X libertarian issues    0.150 (0.100) 
Petty bourgeoisie X libertarian issues    0.120 (0.097) 
Skilled manual workers X libertarian issues    0.134* (0.069) 
Semiskilled manual workers X libertarian issues    0.186* (0.098) 
Unskilled manual workers X libertarian issues    0.183* (0.101) 
Managers       
Professionals X authoritarian issues    -0.026 (0.094) 
Non-manual routine X authoritarian issues    0.265** (0.094) 
Petty bourgeoisie X authoritarian issues    0.085 (0.093) 
Skilled manual workers X authoritarian issues    0.063 (0.063) 
Semiskilled manual workers X authoritarian issues    0.170* (0.090) 
Unskilled manual workers X authoritarian issues    0.265** (0.093) 
Var. Country level 
 56.07*** (21.16)  52.72*** (19.92)  52.72*** (19.94) 
Var. Year level 
 4.11**** (0.69)  3.44**** (0.60)  3.42**** (0.58) 
Var. Individual niveau 
 231.03**** (0.91)  214.75**** (0.85)  214.75**** (0.85) 
Var. Random slopes country level           
Managers   REF  REF  
Professionals   0.293* (0.174) 0.289* (0.170) 
Non-manual routine   0.921** (0.426) 0.882** (0.407) 
Petty Bourgeoisie    1.071** (0.470) 1.071** (0.484) 
Skilled manual workers   0.299** (0.154) 0.268** (0.140) 
Semiskilled manual workers   3.774** (1.480) 3.585** (1.407) 
Unskilled manual workers   4.743** (1.847) 4.581** (1.782) 
Var. Random slopes year level       
Managers   REF  REF  
Professionals   0.157*** (0.056) 0.126** (0.050) 
Non-manual routine   0.095** (0.046) 0.077* (0.043) 
Petty Bourgeoisie    0.212*** (0.065) 0.214*** (0.065) 
Skilled manual workers   0.033 (0.029) 0.032 (0.029) 
Semiskilled manual workers   0.106* (0.048) 0.096* (0.045) 
Unskilled manual workers   0.117** (0.049) 0.098* (0.046) 
Deviance 1068332   1059396  1059327  
∆ DF    21  12  
*p< 0.1 ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01; **** p< 0.001   
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while all other classes prefer more left-wing parties. The traditional ties between class and 
party preference are confirmed in this model: compared to the working class the middle class 
has a stronger preference for rightist parties. There are no significant effects for the context 
variables, which means that there is no general tendency to increasingly vote for a leftist or 
rightist party among the electorate, and that there is no general tendency of in the 
voting behavior of electorates in particular countries where libertarian or authoritarian issues 
are of particular salience. 
In model 1 we also checked whether the effects of class position on voting behavior 
significantly varies between the years and countries, which proves to be the case.11 At the 
country level, all slopes vary significantly between countries, at the year level all slopes 
significantly vary except for that of the skilled manual workers. This means that class 
membership does not affect voting behavior similarly across countries and in time. Put 
differently, the degree to which the working class votes left and the degree to which the 
middle class votes right depends on the country and on the election year in which they vote. 
The question is whether these differences can be explained by differences in political culture.  
To answer this question, in model 2 we will test whether the classes decreasingly tend 
to vote according to traditional class party alignments in political contexts in which 
authoritarian and libertarian issues are of great importance. To this end, in model 2, the 
interaction effects of all classes with the salience of both authoritarian and libertarian issues 
are estimated.12 The variances of the random slopes show, in most cases, a decline compared 
to the variances of these slopes in model 2. This means that the degree to which class affects 
voting behavior can be explained by the saliences of libertarian and authoritarian issues. In 
model 2 we see that as libertarian issues are more important in a context the middle class 
votes more for leftist parties. Compared to the classes of the managers the three manual 
classes are more inclined to vote for rightist parties as libertarian issues are more important. 
Or, put differently, compared to the manual classes, all middle-class parties are more inclined 
to vote for leftist parties as libertarian issues are more important. This confirms hypothesis 3b: 
the middle class decreasingly votes for the traditional parties of their class as libertarian issues 
are more important.  
Because the working class has not moved right in the period before 1975, hypothesis 
5b – explaining why the working class should move right – cannot be verified anymore. So, 
for the period before 1975, there simply cannot be an alienating effect of the rising salience of 
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libertarian issues. Moreover, above we found that the working class in this period also moved 
to the left, but this move to the left is not attributable to the rising salience of libertarian 
issues. But what about the move to the right of the working class in the period after 1975? 
Can this change in party-preference be explained by the rising salience of authoritarian 
issues?  
Compared to the class of the managers, the classes of the routine non-manual workers, 
the semi-skilled workers, and the unskilled workers are more inclined to vote for right-wing 
parties in contexts where authoritarian issues are more important. The middle class 
(managers, professionals, and petty bourgeoisie) thus increasingly votes left in contexts in 
which authoritarian issues are more important. Above we found that de middle class has 
continued to move left in the period after 1975. Combined with the rising salience of 
authoritarian issues in this period, and the fact that the middle class increasingly votes left in 
contexts in which these issues are salient, hypothesis 4b can be confirmed. Because the 
working class has increasingly been voting right in the period after 1975, authoritarian issues 
have become more important in this period, and members of the working class are more 
inclined to vote right in contexts where authoritarian issues are important, the last hypothesis 
can also be confirmed.  
In short, the middle class has moved left in the periods before and after 1975. Before 
1975, they moved left because new left libertarian issues appealed to them, and afterwards 
because new right authoritarian issues alienated them from right. Only from 1975 onwards the 
working class has moved right because of the rising salience of authoritarian issues appealing 
them to do so. The working class, however, did not alienate from leftist parties in periods in 
which libertarian issues were increasing in salience.  
  
 
8 Conclusions 
 
In this article we investigated the questions in what way the political cultures of western 
countries have changed and how this has led to a rightist working class and a leftist middle 
class. We showed that only in the period before 1975 libertarian issues have increased in 
importance but not afterwards. The reverse is true for the salience of authoritarian issues: 
before 1975 there was little to no change and after 1975 the importance of authoritarian issues 
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increased very rapidly. The changes in political culture can therefore best be described by the 
revolution – counterrevolution perspective of Ignazi (2003), and the other two perspectives 
need to be rejected. Because of the changes in the political culture, a rising salience of 
libertarian issues preceding that of authoritarian issues, the classic pattern of a leftist voting 
working class and a rightist voting middle class has lost ground. As libertarian issues rise in 
salience members of the middle class increasingly vote left, and as authoritarian issues rise in 
salience both members of the middle class and of the working class left the traditional parties 
of their classes. The mechanism of appellation – that with growing appeals sections of the 
middle class and working class will increasingly abandon the traditional class parties – is 
therefore strongly supported, while the mechanism of alienation – that political parties 
estrange their traditional class electorate by focussing on other issues – is confirmed only for 
the middle class. 
In his thesis Nieuwbeerta argued that the theory provided by Inglehart that covers 
issues of political and cultural change, is no full-blooming and promising alternative for 
explaining differences in class voting (Nieuwbeerta, 1995: 201). We disagree with 
Nieuwbeerta in this respect, and think that it provides a good alternative to explain why so 
many members of the working class increasingly vote for rightist parties and why so many 
members of the middle class increasingly vote for leftist parties. However, this does not mean 
we totally agree with Inglehart’s theory on the changing nature of political cultures. His view 
that cultural issues are increasingly becoming important causing traditional class party 
alignments to cave in, has basically been confirmed in this paper.  However, the notion that 
new politics is basically new leftist or libertarian politics has to be refuted: new rightist, or 
authoritarian issues, are new politics as well.13  
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Notes 
                                                
1
 After an exploration of the available literature Achterberg (2004) concludes that there are roughly two types of 
new issues in the new political culture: cultural issues and ecological issues. Ecological issues are those referring 
to environmental protection and sustainable development. Since for ecological issues it is unclear whether they 
can be distinguished from the old issues of class (those who can, are more willing to pay to protect the 
environment), they are not considered in this article.  
2
 In the second part of this article we will investigate the influence of the rise of the new political culture on the 
degree to which the working class and the middle class vote respectively left and right. This will be done using 
the same data Nieuwbeerta has used to show that traditional class party alignments have declined over the years. 
These data contain information for sixteen countries, of which we shall use fifteen countries for which the proper 
information for our measurements is available. For these fifteen countries we create an index to measure the 
salience of libertarian and authoritarian issues. 
3
 Principal component analysis on these two items rendered a factor explaining 54% of the variance in both 
separate items. The factor loadings of the items on this factor are 0.74. 
4
 Principal component analysis on these two items rendered a factor explaining 51% of the variance in both 
separate items. The factor loadings of the items on this factor are 0.71. 
5
 The peak in 1960 is the remarkable salience of libertarian issues in the United States. If this peak is left out of 
the analysis the same picture of a rising salience of libertarian issues arises for this period, and is the trend even 
stronger (Pearson’s r = 0.200**). 
6
 This is primarily due to the salience of authoritarian issues during the first decade after World War II in which 
issues of social order obviously were more important since they were missing since the war.  
7
 See also Inglehart (1997: 244) who points to the negative reactions of the working class to the new-leftist 
political climate causing considerable working-class support for the conservative De Gaulle in 1968 (in Fance).  
8
 Data files for each country/ year combination (1956-1990) 
Country 1956-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 Total Period 
Australia 2 2 5 9 1967-1990 
Austria - 1 3 4 1974-1980 
Belgium - 1 - 1 1975 
Canada - - 1 1 1984 
Denmark - 1 - 1 1972 
Finland - 2 - 2 1972-1975 
France - 1 - 1 1978 
Germany 1 6 6 13 1969-1990 
Great Britain 3 2 7 12 1964-1990 
Italy 1 1 1 3 1968-1985 
The Netherlands 1 6 7 14 1970-1990 
Norway  1 2 4 7 1975-1990 
Switzerland - 2 - 2 1972-1976 
United States 7 8 9 24 1956-1990 
Total 16 35 43 94 1956-1990 
 
9
 Because of this slightly differing measurement for voting behavior, and especially because of the use of the 
left-right self-identification, not all original data files of Nieuwbeerta are used. Nineteen of 113 original files are 
no longer used (see note 8) 
10
 The dependent variable has been multiplied by 10 in comparison to the analyses in table 3 for a better 
interpretation of the coefficients of the random slopes at year level. 
11
 In total twenty-one degrees of freedom were used for model one, giving a reduction of 8936 in deviance. 
Model one clearly improves the fit of the model. 
12
 Twelve degrees of freedom were used for model two, giving a reduction of 69 in deviance. This model two 
clearly improves the fit of the model.  
13
 That Inglehart totally ignores this is due to the fact that he uses the Postmaterialism-index to measure political 
cultural change (cf. Houtman, 2003: 136-138). This measurement simply does not allow for rightist post-
materialists. 
